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INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to the Court's January 26, 2007 Supplemental Brief Order,
Dr. Chamberlain and Central Utah Medical Clinic (collectively "Dr. Chamberlain")
submit this supplemental brief in response to Rebekah Munson's ("Ms. Munson") brief
supplementing Point III of her opening brief In Point III, Ms. Munson asks the Court to
overturn Doe v. Maret 1999 UT 74, 984 P.2d 980, which interprets the confidentiality
provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (the "Act"). The Act provides that
all proceedings before the prelitigation review panel are "confidential, privileged, and
immune from civil process." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(d).
In Doe, the Court held that "because the notice of intent serves as the basis for the
prelitigation panel review, and because it is often utilized as part of the prelitigation
review, it is part of the proceeding and must be kept confidential." 1999 UT 74 at f21.
Here, the trial court followed Doe in ruling that Ms. Munson had violated the
confidentiality of the prelitigation proceedings by providing to Dr. Jacobs—her testifying
expert—the notice of intent and an opinion letter, both of which were prepared for,
provided to, and considered by the prelitigation panel. (R. 259-60.) The trial court then
disqualified Dr. Jacobs because Dr. Chamberlain's counsel could not cross-examine him
about his reliance on these documents without further violating confidentiality. (Id.)
In Ms. Munson's supplemental brief, she advances two arguments. First, she
argues that Doe frustrates the purpose of the Act because it discourages litigants from
"obtaining or using an expert evaluation in the prelitigation phase of the case," which
reduces the likelihood of settlement. (Aplt. Sup. Br. at 2.) Second, Ms. Munson argues
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that Doe produces "absurd results" because Dr. Jacobs could have learned the
information from alternative sources. (Id. at 4.) Both arguments fail.
First, Doe does not discourage litigants from using experts before the prehtigation
panel, but instead merely prevents public disclosure of the materials submitted to the
panel. As long as the materials submitted to and discussions before the panel are kept
confidential, there is nothing to discourage the use of experts. The confidentiality
provisions of the Act do not apply to documents—such as medical records—that would
have existed were there no prehtigation review panels. It instead makes confidential
those materials prepared for and submitted to the panel. The Act does not discourage the
use of experts.
Second, it is no more absurd that settlement discussions or attorney-client
communications cannot be disclosed even though their content may be available from
other sources than it is that proceedings before the prehtigation panel cannot be disclosed
when their content may be available from other sources. Contrary to Ms. Munson's
assertion, when information is available from other sources the confidentiality
requirements of the Act are less burdensome not more. This case proves the point: Had
Dr. Jacobs relied only upon non-prelitigation sources, Dr. Chamberlain's counsel could
have cross-examined him about them, and the parties would not be here.
As demonstrated below, Doe's interpretation of section 78-14-12(l)(d) is not only
perfectly sensible, but is supported by the section's plain language, its legislative history,
and the legislative purpose of the Act. The Court should affirm.

2
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ARGUMENT
L

The Plain Language of the Act Requires Documents Provided to the
Prelitigation Review Panel Be Kept Confidential
Doe is consistent with the plain language of the Act. The Court "ascertain[s] the

legislature's intent by looking to the statute's plain meaning, and to its various provisions
viewed as a whole." State v. Bohne, 2002 UT 116, f 15, 63 P.3d 63. The Act requires all
medical malpractice plaintiffs initially to present their case to a prelitigation review
panel, which determines whether the malpractice claim has merit. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-14-12 to -14. To ensure candor before the panel, the Act provides that all
"[proceedings conducted under authority of this section are confidential, privileged, and
immune from civil process." Id. at § 78-14-12(l)(d). As an added measure, the Act also
provides that "[e]vidence of the proceedings conducted by the medical review panel and
its results, opinions, findings, and determinations are not admissible as evidence in an
action subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of competent jurisdiction." Id. at
§78-14-15(1).
In Doe, the Court recognized that documents provided to and considered by the
panel are part of the proceedings: "because the notice of intent serves as the basis for the
prelitigation panel review, and because it is often utilized as part of the prelitigation
review, it is part of the proceeding and must be kept confidential." 1999 UT 74 at Tf21.
The Court's interpretation of "proceedings" to include documents submitted to the panel
comports with its plain meaning, which is "the form or manner of conducting judicial [or
administrative] business." Black's Law Dictionary 1204 (6th ed. 1990). The panel's

3
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business includes reviewing the documents submitted by the parties, and thus, these
documents are "part" of the proceedings.
This interpretation is confirmed by section 78-14-13(1), which provides that "[n]o
record of the proceedings is required," and then clarifies that it does not mean only that
no transcript is required, but also that the panel will not retain "evidence, documents, and
exhibits." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-13(1). Elsewhere, the Act uses "prelitigation
hearings" instead of "proceedings" when the language does not encompass "evidence,
documents, and exhibits." Id. at § 78-14-12(1). Doe was therefore correct in interpreting
section 78-14-12(l)(d) to encompass all documents presented to the panel as "part of the
proceedings." 1999 UT at 74 ^[21.
Doe was also correct to hold that any part of the proceedings—including the
notice of intent and opinion letter—is confidential. The plain language of section 78-1415(1) provides that any "evidence of the proceedings" is inadmissible, meaning any
documents presented to the panel are inadmissible. However, section 78-14-12(l)(d)—
the section interpreted in Doe and applied by the trial court—goes much further by
making such documents not just inadmissible, but "confidential, privileged, and immune
from civil process." Id. The plain language of the Act supports Doe's holding that
documents submitted to the panel cannot be disclosed to the general public because they
are "part" of the proceedings and are therefore confidential.
And because the confidentiality is imposed by the Legislature, neither the parties
nor the panel may waive confidentiality without statutory authorization, which does not
exist here. The Act outlines exceptions to the confidentiality requirement, such as when
4
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the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing needs information about the
proceedings to detect or prove "unprofessional or unlawful conduct." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-15(3). However, the Act does not create a similar exception permitting
Ms. Munson to share confidential prelitigation documents with an expert who will testify
in open court simply because it serves her private litigation purposes.
The Court has refused to create exceptions to plainly worded confidentiality
requirements in the past. For instance, in Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic v.
Frederick, the Court refused to create an exception to a legislatively imposed
confidentiality on communications with family therapists. 890 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1995).
In Frederick, the statute enumerated four exceptions to the confidentiality requirement,
and the Court refused to create an additional exception because "amendments to correct
the inequities should be made by the legislature and not by judicial interpretation." IcL at
1021. As the Court explained, "it is not our prerogative to rewrite that section or to
question the wisdom, social desirability, or public policy underlying it."1 Id
Ms. Munson asks the Court to overturn Doe and do here what the Court declined
to do in Frederick—create an exception to confidentiality provided by statute. In this

1

When the Utah Legislature intends to provide an exception to confidentiality provided
by statute, it does so expressly. Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-8-8, -13 (2002)
(information disclosed to Board of Oil, Gas and Mining is confidential unless waived or
mining operation terminates); Utah Code Ann. § 34-38-13 (2004) (results of employer
tests for drugs or alcohol are confidential subject to exceptions listed inlhe statute), with
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3e-2 (1986) (identity of person informing about illegal activity at
schools is confidential); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-313 (1981) (information on abortions is
confidential); Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-37 (1971) (information provided by marriage
license applicant is strictly confidential); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-17.1 (1969)
(communications to domestic relations counselor confidential).
5
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case, the confidential documents are a notice of intent and opinion letter that were
presented to the prelitigation panel and later provided to an expert who would testify in
open court. The plain language of the Act does not describe an exception for testifying
experts, and the Court should not create one. Ms. Munson breached the confidentiality
requirement in section 7S-14~\2(\)(d) when she provided the notice of intent and opinion
letter to her testifying expert.2 The Court should affirm.
II.

The Legislative History of the Act Confirms Doe Was Correctly Decided
The holding of Doe is confirmed by the history surrounding the enactment of

section 78-14-12 in 1985. World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879
P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994) (if plain language does not decide the proper interpretation of
a statute, the court "seek[s] guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy
considerations."). While the floor debates shed no light on the question before the Court,
a letter from the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel reveals that the
Legislature modeled section 78-14-12 on a then-similar Idaho statute. See Legislative
Review Letter from the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, attached as

2

At times, Ms. Munson suggests that she did not breach the confidentiality requirement
because all she did was provide the documents to her expert, and that act alone did not
disclose any documents to the public. (Aplt. Reply Br. at 9-10.) However, this is also
inconsistent with Doe, where the Court held a party had breached the confidentiality
requirement by attaching the notice of intent to a brief. Doe, 1999 UT 74 at f21.
Attaching a notice of intent to a brief submitted to the Court no more discloses the notice
of intent to the public than providing it to a testifying expert does. However, the
important point in Doe is that by attaching the document to a brief the document would
thereby be accessible to the public, as briefs are made public. Here, by providing the
notice of intent and opinion letter to a testifying expert, Ms. Munson similarly opened
those documents to the public when the expert later testified.
6
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Exhibit A (stating that the statute is "patterned after Idaho's statute"). The history of the
Idaho statute confirms that all documents presented to a prelitigation panel—such as a
notice of intent or opinion letter—were intended to remain confidential.
Before Idaho's statute was amended in 1990, it had a confidentiality provision
virtually identical to those contained in the Act. The Act has two sections governing how
evidence concerning the proceedings can (not) be used—sections 78-14-12(l)(d) and 7814-15(1). The former provides that all "[proceedings conducted under authority of this
section are confidential, privileged, and immune from civil process." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-12(l)(d). The latter provides that "[ejvidence of the proceedings conducted by
the medical review panel and its results, opinions, findings, and determinations are not
admissible as evidence in an action subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of
competent jurisdiction." Id. at § 78-14-15(1). Idaho's version combined these two
provisions, but was otherwise identical: "Proceedings conducted or maintained under the
authority of this act shall at all times be confidential, privileged and immune from civil
process and evidence of them or results, findings or determinations thereof shall be
inadmissible in any civil or other action or proceeding." Idaho Code § 6-1001 (1976).
The subsequent history of Idaho's version confirms that "proceedings" include
documents submitted to the panel. In 1990, the Idaho Legislature amended section 61001, removed the confidentiality provision, and replaced it with a statement that the
proceedings shall be "subject to disclosure according to chapter 3, title 9, Idaho Code."
Idaho Code § 6-1001 (1990). Chapter 3, title 9, of the Idaho Code is Idaho's Public
Records Act, which specifies that all records created by a public entity are open for
7
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public inspection. Idaho Code §§ 9-337 through -347. Realizing the Public Records Act
could not apply to all public records, the Idaho Legislature specified categories of records
that were exempt from public inspection. Idaho Code §§ 9-340-340H.
When outlining the exemptions relevant to Idaho's prelitigation statute, the Idaho
Legislature did not simply exempt all "proceedings" before a prelitigation panel, but
instead exempted only a subset of the proceedings, namely "records, findings,
determinations, and decisions." Idaho Code § 9-340C. The Idaho Legislature's choice of
language is revealing: The "records" of the prelitigation panel are "part" of its
proceedings; otherwise, the exemption makes no sense. This is precisely how this Court
interpreted Utah's statute in Doe.
The failure of the Utah Legislature to articulate any exceptions to the Act's
confidentiality requirement bolsters the conclusion that section 78-14-12(l)(d)
encompasses all documents provided to the panel. As Ms. Munson points out in the
opening brief, in 2002—three years after the Court decided Doe—the Utah Legislature
amended section 78-14-12, but did not amend subsection 78-14-12(l)(d). (Aplt. Br. at
10.) If Doe were plainly incorrect or had led to "absurd results" as Ms. Munson
contends, one would have expected the Legislature to have created the very exception for

3

Other states have followed Idaho's lead in creating express exceptions to the
confidentiality of prelitigation proceedings by legislation. See, e.g., 24 Maine Revised
Statute § 2857 (enumerating a number of exceptions); Louisiana Statute Ann.
§ 40:1299.39.1 (specifying that members of the panel may be called as witnesses);
Kansas Stat. § 65-4904 (stating that the prelitigation panel's determination "shall be
admissible in any subsequent legal proceeding, and either party may subpoena any and all
members of the panel as witnesses for examination relating to the issues at trial"); Va.
Code Ann. § 8.01-581.8 (same); Ark. Stat. § 09.55.536 (same).
8
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testifying experts that Ms. Munson urges the Court to create. The history of the Act, as
well as the history of the Idaho act it was patterned after, confirms what the plain
language of the Act already says: Documents presented to the panel must be kept
confidential, and there is no exception to this requirement for expert witnesses who will
testify in open court. The Court should affirm.
III.

Doe Is Consistent with the Purpose of the Act and Expresses Sound Public
Policy
Doe is also consistent with the purpose of the Act and expresses sound public

policy. First, keeping the entirety of the proceedings before the panel—including the
documents provided to the panel—confidential furthers the stated purpose of the Act to
"expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2. As
with settlement negotiations, the parties are much more likely to communicate with
candor if their statements are protected from disclosure and cannot later be used in
litigation. Second, keeping all materials provided to the prelitigation panel confidential
creates a bright line rule that litigants and trial courts can easily follow, just as they have
done since Doe was decided in 1999. For both reasons, the Court should reaffirm Doe
and affirm the trial court's ruling.
A.

Doe Expedites Settlement by Encouraging Candor Before the Panel

Doe furthers the purpose of the prelitigation proceedings by encouraging frank
discussion before the panel to "expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims." Id. at
§ 78-14-2. Parties must feel free to discuss the merits of the claim candidly without fear
that any admission or misstatement may later be used in litigation. Such candor permits

9
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each party to evaluate the claim before it is filed, which increases the chances of
settlement.
A similar purpose is achieved by the attorney-client privilege, Rule 408 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence, and keeping confidential alternative dispute resolution
proceedings such as mediation. See Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Res.
Corp., 801 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1990) (stating that the attorney-client privilege is
"intended to encourage candor between attorney and client and promote the best possible
representation of the client"); State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58,1J46, 27 P.3d 1115 ("Rule 408
is premised on the idea that encouraging settlement of civil claims justifies excluding
otherwise probative evidence from civil lawsuits.") (quotations and citation omitted);
Goodyear Tire & Rubber v. Chiles Power Supply, 332 F.3d 976, 980 (6th Cir. 2003)
(stating that "[tjhere exists a strong public interest in favor of secrecy of matters
discussed by parties during settlement negotiations . . . [because] in order for settlement
talks to be effective, parties must feel uninhibited in their communications").
In fact, the candid discussion permitted by maintaining the confidentiality of
settlement conferences or mediations is so important that other courts—like the trial court
in this case—have imposed sanctions for violating this confidentiality. For example, the
Utah Court of Appeals has admonished counsel for violating the confidentiality of a
court-ordered mediation. See Lyons v. Booker, 1999 UT App 172; 982 P.2d 1142.
Following the Tenth Circuit, the court noted that "the guarantee of confidentiality is
essential to the proper functioning of an appellate settlement conference program and
revealing statements or comments made at a settlement conference is a serious breach of
10
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confidentiality." Id. at f 11 (quotations and citations omitted). The court then reiterated
the policy behind the confidentiality requirement: "to be successful, participants must
trust that matters discussed at a conference will not be revealed." Id.
Two rulings in a recent Michigan case further illustrate the point. See Irwin
Seating Co. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., No. l:04-cv-568, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10472 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2007).4 In Irwin, the court disqualified an expert witness
from testifying because the expert had been exposed to confidential mediation
communications. Id at * 17. Like Ms. Munson, the plaintiff had provided its experts
with "confidential mediation statements" and the experts reviewed these documents in
preparing their opinions. Id. at *1. Also like Ms. Munson, the plaintiff contended
(i) "that disclosure to its own retained experts was disclosure to agents of itself, the
represented party, and therefore was not a breach of confidentiality" and (ii) even if it
was a breach, disqualification was too severe a sanction. Id. at *7. The court disagreed,
ruling that "[bjecause the information in issue is confidential, Defendants will be unable
to fully challenge the expert's assertions that their opinions were not influenced by
confidential settlement knowledge." Id. at *3.
In Irwin, the district court affirmed a recommendation by the magistrate judge,
who explained that disqualification was not too harsh because, like here, the plaintiffs
had "placed [their] experts at risk by infusing them with knowledge to which they were
not entitled." Irwin Seating Co. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., No. l:04-cv-568,

4

A copy of this opinion is attached as Exhibit B.
11
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2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86988 at *4 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 29, 2006).5 It was enough to
warrant disqualification that the extent to which the confidential information affected the
experts "in shaping their approaches and opinion, is not truly knowable nor easily
remediable." Id. Like the trial court here, Irwin considers disqualification of an expert
appropriate for a breach of confidentiality committed when a party provides documents to
a testifying expert.
The rule announced in Doe similarly furthers the purpose of the Act. The
confidentiality envisioned by the Legislature in enacting section 78-14-12(l)(d) can
accomplish the purpose of promoting frank discussion in the prelitigation proceedings
only if courts can sanction litigants for violating confidentiality. Far from prejudicing
litigants, Doe provides them an opportunity to resolve a case before incurring needless,
burdensome litigation expenses. All documents created for the prelitigation hearing and
submitted to the panel must be kept confidential to further the Act's purpose.
B.

Doe Announced a Bright Line Rule that Is Easy to Follow

Perhaps the most important aspect of Doe, however, is that it announces a bright
line rule that is easy to understand and follow. The rule merely requires all parties to
keep confidential any document created for and utilized by the prelitigation panel. If the
document would not exist but for the prelitigation requirements specified in the Act, it
cannot be disclosed. Thus, medical records, for example, are not made confidential
merely by being provided to the panel because they would have been available even if
there were no prelitigation requirements. The documents at issue here—a notice of intent
5

A copy of this opinion is attached as Exhibit C.
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and an opinion letter (created for the panel)—however, would not exist but for the
prelitigation proceedings, and therefore, they are confidential. As demonstrated below,
this rule applies to nearly all settlement materials, and there is no reason for a different
rule riddled with exceptions for the prelitigation setting.
The rale announced in Doe does not prejudice any party because it accounts for
the distinction between the underlying facts of a case and the documents specifically
prepared for, presented to, and considered by the prelitigation panel. While section 7814-12(l)(d) plainly forbids disclosure of documents specifically prepared for and
presented to the panel, it does not render every bit of information contained in those
documents confidential and inadmissible at trial.
This distinction between underlying facts and the confidential communication
employing those facts is reflected in both the attorney-client privilege and Rule 408. One
cannot make facts inadmissible merely by uttering them to one's attorney. See Jackson v.
Kennecott Copper Corp., 27 Utah 2d 310, 315, 495 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1972) (stating
that a person "cannot foreclose the discovery process by the simple expedient of
funneling [information] into its counsel's custody"). Similarly, Rule 408 expressly draws
the distinction, as it "does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise
discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations."
UtahR. Evid. 408.
While reciting facts to one's attorney or during settlement negotiations does not
make the facts subject to Rule 408, any communications prepared for and exchanged
during settlement negotiations are inadmissible, even if they contain information that is
13
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otherwise admissible. Once this common-sense distinction is drawn and applied to
section 78-14-12(l)(d), Ms. Munson's argument that Doe produces absurd results fades
away. The only burden the rule places on plaintiffs is the same burden that existed before
prelitigation panels were created: Plaintiffs must prove their claims using only evidence
that would have existed if there were no prelitigation process.6
Thus, Ms. Munson's expert was free to review any of the independent facts of Ms.
Munson's claim in developing his opinion. It was Ms. Munson's choice not to follow
this course, and instead to breach the confidentiality of the prelitigation proceedings that
tainted her expert. See Irwin, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86988 at *4 (plaintiffs placed their
experts and their opinions at "risk by infusing them with knowledge to which they were
not entitled"). The rule announced in Doe does not prejudice litigants.
There is no reason to depart from the current bright line rule and carve out the
exception Ms. Munson urges. As the trial court recognized, to do so would create a
"confused and unpredictable jurisprudence that would undermine the purposes" of the
Act, including reducing the chances of "early settlement in an environment in which
parties can speak candidly without fear of subsequent disclosure of the proceedings, and
critical documents produced therein." (R. at 555, p. 44). The Court should affirm.

6

Unlike in earlier briefing, Ms. Munson appears to concede this point in her supplemental
brief: "Even if the documents in question were rendered confidential by statute, the
actual information that was contained therein was information that could and would have
been accessible by any other expert who was subsequently retained to offer further
assistance." (Aplt. Sup. Br. at 4.)
14
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CONCLUSION
The Court should reaffirm Doe's holding that the confidentiality specified in
section 78-14-12(l)(d) applies to all communications—written or otherwise—that are
made during prelitigation proceedings. The purpose of the Act is to provide "procedural
changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims/' which like the purpose of
the attorney-client privilege and Rule 408, can be accomplished only by keeping all such
communications private. In fact, the confidentiality requirement in section 78-1412(l)(d) is more stringent than the attorney-client privilege, as it cannot be waived by a
party; and it is more stringent than Rule 408. as section 78-14-12(l)(d) makes all
proceedings before the panel "confidential, privileged, and immune from civil process."
The plain language, legislative history, and legislative purpose all support Doe's
holding that litigants must keep documents submitted to a prelitigation panel confidential.
Following Doe, the trial court ruled that Ms. Munson had breached confidentiality by
providing her testifying expert the notice of intent and opinion letter. The trial court then
appropriately disqualified Ms. Munson's expert because Dr. Chamberlain's counsel could
not cross-examine him about his reliance on those documents. The Court should affirm.
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2007.
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P.

Curtis J.T5?ake
Troy L. ^Tooher
Chris Martinez
Attorneys for Appellee
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CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff company appealed the magistrate judge's order
striking plaintiff's expert witnesses as a remedy for plaintiff's breach of mediation
confidentiality.
OVERVIEW: After the court referred the action to voluntary facilitative mediation, the
parties furnished mediation statements and accompanying documents, highlighting those
portions of the exhibits the parties believed to be most important. Plaintiff later provided
defendant corporations' mediation statements and accompanying highlighted documents
to two experts who were expected to testify for plaintiff at trial on the issues of liability
and damages. Although plaintiff contended that the sanction was unduly harsh, the court
found that the magistrate's factual determinations were not clearly erroneous and that the
striking of plaintiff's experts was not contrary to law. The magistrate properly found that
the mediation documents were intended to be confidential and for settlement purposes
only pursuant to the order of the mediator, W.D. Mich. Civ. R. 16.2(e), and Fed. R. Evid.
408. Regardless of whether plaintiff acted in bad faith, the magistrate found that plaintiff
intentionally released the information and that the exposure of defendants' case theory to
plaintiff's experts could not simply be forgotten by those experts. Further, the information
was inherently prejudicial to defendants.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the order of the magistrate judge striking plaintiff's
experts. The court, however, permitted plaintiff to designate new experts.
CORE TERMS: mediation, settlement, confidentiality, negotiations, disclosure, confidential,
reply brief, discovery, confidential information, totality, attachments, clearly erroneous,
compromised, waived, facilitative, mediator, harsh, appropriate remedy, opposing party,
cross-examination, nondispositive, effectiveness, discoverable, dispositive, admissible,
misleading, ill-gotten, pretrial, opposing, assign
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factual finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. The
question before the court is not whether the finding is the best or only conclusion
that can be drawn from the evidence, or whether it is the one which the reviewing
court would draw. Rather, the test is whether there is evidence in the record to
support the lower court's finding, and whether its construction of that evidence is a
reasonable one. More Like This Headnote

Civil Procedure > Judicial Officers > Magistrates > Pretrial Orders *y3
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magistrate is afforded broad discretion in the resolution of nondispositive discovery
disputes, which the district court will overrule only if that discretion is clearly
abused.
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±Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), a party may not thereafter assign as error a defect in
the magistrate judge's order to which objection was not timely made. Moreover, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit repeatedly has recognized that
arguments raised for the first time in a party's reply brief are
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±The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit repeatedly has recognized
that there exists a strong public interest in favor of secrecy of matters discussed by
parties during settlement negotiations. This is true whether settlement negotiations
are done under the auspices of the court or informally between the parties. The
ability to negotiate and settle a case without trial fosters a more efficient, more costeffective, and significantly less burdened judicial system. In order for settlement
talks to be effective, parties must feel uninhibited in their
communications. More Like This Headnote
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Chamberlain LLP, Grand Rapids, MI.
For J.D. Edwards World Solutions Company, defendant: Stephen J. Rosenfeld S*p LEAD
ATTORNEY, Kristin Lee Lingren ^, Suzanne Miriam Scheuing *f Natalie A. Harris • , Mandell
Menkes LLC, Chicago, IL; Earle I. Erman • € , Erman Teicher Miller Zucker & Freedman PC,
Southfield, MI.
For Facilitative Mediator, mediator: Bruce W. Neckers J&, LEAD ATTORNEY, Rhoades McKee,
Grand Rapids, MI.
For International Business Machines Corporation, counter-claimant:
Charles E. Chamberlain, Jr. ^ , LEAD ATTORNEY, Willey & Chamberlain LLP, Grand Rapids,
M I ; Mary Laura Swietnicki • , Todd C. Jacobs • , Grippo & Elden LLC, Chicago, IL.
For Irwin Seating Company, counter-defendant: Joseph [ * 2 ] Goldberg, LEAD ATTORNEY,
Freedman Boyd Daniels Hollander & Goldberg PA, Albuquerque, NM.
JUDGES: Robert Holmes Bell, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
O P I N I O N BY: Robert Holmes Bell
O P I N I O N : This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs appeal (Docket # 313) of the
Magistrate Judge's order striking Plaintiffs expert witnesses (Docket # 310). For the reasons
that follow, the order of the Magistrate Judge is affirmed.

I.
This matter was referred to voluntary facilitative mediation by this Court on October 2 1 ,
2005. The notice of appointment of facilitative mediator outlined the procedures for
mediation and, among other things, provided that "all information disclosed during the
mediation session, including the conduct and demeanor of the parties and their counsel
during the proceedings, must remain confidential, and must not be disclosed to any other
party nor to this court, without consent of the party disclosing the information." (Notice of
Appointment of Facilitative Mediator, at 2, docket # 94.)
Subsequently, at the direction of the mediator, the parties furnished mediation statements
and accompanying documents, highlighting those portions of the exhibits the parties believed
to be [ * 3 ] most important. The Magistrate Judge found, and Plaintiff Irwin has not disputed,
that Irwin later provided Defendants' mediation statements and accompanying highlighted
documents to two experts expected to testify for Plaintiff at trial.
On April 18, 2006, Plaintiff produced two expert reports, one by Jeff Hagins assessing the
liability of the Defendants, and the other by Marianne DeMario assessing damages. Each
expert report declared that the expert had reviewed the mediation briefs and exhibits
produced by Defendants. DeMario's report extensively cited to portions of the mediation
attachments. All of the attachments to the mediation statement were otherwise produced
during discovery. However, the mediation attachments were highlighted to identify those
portions Plaintiff believed to be significant to the case.

The Magistrate Judge held that the mediation proceedings and documents were intended to
be confidential and for settlement purposes only, pursuant to the order of appointment of
mediator, W.D. MICH. LCIVR 16.2(e), FED. R. EVID. 408 and established Sixth Circuit case
law. The Magistrate Judge reasoned that, regardless of whether Plaintiff [ * 4 ] acted with bad
faith, Plaintiff was solely at fault for the breach of confidentiality and had acted intentionally
to release the information. The Magistrate Judge further concluded that the exposure by
Plaintiffs experts to Defendants' case theory could not simply be forgotten by those experts.
Moreover, since any attempt to cross-examine those experts as to the specifics of their
recollection would itself expose confidential information, the Magistrate Judge concluded that
the only appropriate remedy was to strike Plaintiffs expert witnesses.
Plaintiff now appeals the Magistrate Judge's order, contending that the sanction is unduly
harsh and unsupported by law.

II.
Under 28 U.S.C. 5 636(b)(1)(A) and FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a), a federal magistrate judge may
be designated to hear and determine nondispositive pretrial matters. Id. Rule 72(a) provides
in relevant part:

H/V1

? A magistrate judge to whom a pretrial matter not dispositive of a claim or
defense of a party is referred to hear and determine shall promptly conduct such
proceedings as are required and when appropriate enter into the record a written
order [ * 5 ] setting forth the disposition of the matter. Within 10 days after being
served with a copy of the magistrate judge's order, a party may serve and file
objections to the order; a party may not thereafter assign as error a defect in the
magistrate judge's order to which objection was not timely made. The district
judge to whom the case is assigned shall consider such objections and shall
modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge's order found to be
clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a). n l
Footnotes

* t t 2 y R u [ e 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure implements 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(A). Massey v. City ofFemdale, 7 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 1993).
n l

End FootnotesHyv3

TA factual "finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Heights Cmty.
Congress v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135, 140 (6th Cir. 1985). [ * 6 ] The question
before the court "is not whether the finding is the best or only conclusion that can be drawn
from the evidence, or whether it is the one which the reviewing court would draw. Rather,
the test is whether there is evidence in the record to support the lower court's finding, and
whether its construction of that evidence is a reasonable one." Id.

H/V4

*?A magistrate is afforded broad discretion in the resolution of nondispositive discovery
disputes, which this Court will overrule only if that discretion is clearly abused. See Dayco
Prod., Inc. v. Walker, 142 F.R.D. 450, 454 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (citing Snowden v. Con naught
Laboratories, Inc., 136 F.R.D. 694 f 697 (D. Kan. 1991); Detection Systems, Inc. v. Pittway
Corp., 96 F.R.D. 152, 154 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Sil-Flo. Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1514
(10th Cir. 1990)).

III.
In its objections to the Magistrate Judge's determination, Plaintiff argues only that the
striking of its expert witnesses is an excessive sanction, not warranted by the nature of the
violation. n2 Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge should have imposed a less [ * 7 ]
severe sanction. Plaintiff contends that it did not act in bad faith to release the mediation
materials, believing that disclosure to its own retained experts was disclosure to agents of
itself, the represented party, and therefore was not a breach of confidentiality. While Plaintiff
no longer asserts that its disclosure was not a violation of the mediation order and the local
rules, it asserts that the reason for the disclosure did not amount to bad faith. Further,
Plaintiff argues that the information contained in the mediation attachments was otherwise
disclosed during discovery and fully available to the experts from other sources. For both
reasons, Plaintiff contends that the harsh sanction of striking experts was not warranted.
Footnotes

n2 In its reply brief, Plaintiff raises two additional issues not raised before either the
Magistrate Judge or in Plaintiff's initial timely objections. First, citing First Bank of Marietta v.
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 5 0 1 , 519 (6th Cir. 2002), Plaintiff argues that a
finding of bad faith is legally required to support the imposition of a sanction under the
Court's inherent authority. Second, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge lacked evidence
to support a finding that Plaintiff's disclosure of mediation materials to the experts had an
adverse impact on Defendants or on the mediation process. Neither argument was raised in
Plaintiffs objections. H / V 5 7Under FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a), "a party may not thereafter assign as
error a defect in the magistrate judge's order to which objection was not timely made." Id.
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit repeatedly has recognized that arguments raised for the first time
in a party's reply brief are waived. See United States v. Lopez-Medina, 4 6 1 F.3d 724, 743
(6th Cir. 2006) (citing McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-96 (6th Cir. 1997) (deeming
arguments that are not raised in the appellant's main brief, or raised merely in a perfunctory
manner, as waived)); see also Lexicon, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, Inc., 436 F.3d
662, 676 (6th Cir. 2006) (a district court properly declines to consider an issue raised for the
first time in a reply brief) (citing, Sundberg v. Keller Ladder, 189 F. Supp. 2d 6 7 1 , 682-83
(E.D. Mich. 2002) (noting, in the context of summary judgment, "it is not the office of a reply
brief to raise issues for the first time") (citation omitted)). For both reasons, the arguments
raised in Plaintiff's reply brief are waived, and the Court declines to address either argument.

Encj Footnotes

[*8]

As the Magistrate Judge fully discussed, the local court rules specifically provide for the
confidentiality of ADR procedures such as voluntary facilitative mediation:
H/v6

+Confidentiality — information disclosed during the ADR process shall not be
revealed to any one else without consent of the party who disclosed the
information. All ADR proceedings are considered to be compromised negotiations
within the meaning of Federal Rules of Evidence 408. n3

V Il i II III 111 I t Ik !«' Hi,."in 11 lii iKhlitiuii, as
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Sixth circuit repeatedly has recognized.

There exists a strong public interest in favor of secrecy of matters discussed by
~' 3 ^ies during settlement negotiations. This is true whether settlemei it
..cyOtiations are done under the auspices of the court or informally between the
parties. The ability to negotiate and settle a case without trial fosters a more
efficient, more cost-effective, and significantly less burdened judicial system. In
order for settlement talks to be effective, parties n in ist feel i n linhibited in tl leii
coi i imunications.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 980 (6th Cir.
2003). T*91
Footnotes
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End Footnote'-

Iri determining that the sanction of striking experts was appropriate, the Magistrate Judge
made a number of factual determinations. First, he noted that Plaintiff conceded that its
attorneys had provided copies of Defendants' mediation briefs and exhibits to the experts,
and both experts acknowledged reading the materials. Indeed, Plaintiff's damages expert
repeatedly referred to the mediation exhibits in her expert report. Although both experts
averred that they did not recall Defendants' mediation positions and further averred that
their opinions were not influenced by their knowledge of those positions, the Magistrate
Judge found those averments unpersuasive. The Magistrate Judge noted that the experts had
used [ * 1 0 ] essentially identical language in their affidavits and that the averments in
question appeared to have been drawn up by the same hand.
The Magistrate Judge further fuuitd that, regardless of Plaintiffs intent in disclosing the
documents, the experts had tecc-Tvtid confidential information. The Magistrate Juclifc"
concluded that no adequate means existed for undoing the experts 1 improper knowledge. As
the Magistrate Judge noted, the facts upon which an expert relies are not required to be
admissible. However, the factual basis for the expert's opinion is subject to inquiry and crossexamination. FED. R. EVID. 703. Because the information in issue is confidential, Defendants
will be unable to fully challenge the experts' assertions that their opinions were not
ir ifluenced by confidential settlement knowledge.
Although Plaintiff continues to argue that the experts were i lot ii ifluei iced by the confidential
• : : •! intent of the mediation briefs or the highlighting of specific portions of the otherwise
discoverable exhibits, the Magistrate Judge's reasons for discrediting the experts' claims are
reasonable. The Court finds no basis for concluding that the finding is [ * 1 1 ] clearly
erroneous. Accepting, therefore, that the experts did remember the mediation positions and
that they were, consciously oi i; n consciously affected by that information the Magistrate

Judge's decision to excli icie the experts was reasonable and soi in id,
Furttlei, contrary to Plaintiffs argument, the Magistrate Judge's decision to strike Plaintiffs
experts is not inconsistent with other federal decisions. In Goodyear Tire & Rubber, applying
the mediation confidentiality privilege,, the Sixth Circuit t ipheld the district court's refusal to
permit discovery about settlement negotiations to support a plaintiffs claim that a witness
had been bribed. 332 F,3d at 983. The court recognized that disclosure of settlement
negotiations, even long after those negotiations had failed, would undermine the public policy
underlying settlement. WLat_980. The court further held that, because settlement
negotiations "are typically punctuated with numerous instances of puffing and posturing since
they are motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the
c l a i m / " the use of "these sort of 'facts' would be highly misleading if allowed [ * 1 2 ] to be
used for purposes other than settlement." Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 332 F.3d at 981 (quoting
United States v. Contra Costa County Water Dist, 678 F.2d 90, 92 (9th Cir. 1982)).
Similarly here,, pei n littii ig plaintiffs experts to testify after having had access to Defendants'
confidential representations has the potential to undermine the willingness of parties to
engage in future settlement negotiations. Further, the "facts" upon which those experts rely
in such briefing have the potential to be misleading because of the purpose for which they
are presented. They therefore may color the expert's conclusions based on a characterization
of the facts distorted by the goal of settlement, In any event, the information provides the
expert with information about the other party's view of tl le significance of particular
evidence.
The
-th Circuit did not approve the identical sanction does not demonstrate
the L
;«;.„«
obs of the sanction imposed in this case. The facts of Goodyear Tire &
Rubber did not call for the striking of an expert. Instead, the problem was fully able to be
addressed by the denial of discovery. Here, in contrast, [ * 1 3 ] Plaintiff cannot identify an
alternate sanction that will adequately address these experts' improper knowledge. No
admonition, reprimand, mediation training or assessment of costs can remove from the
experts' minds the information to which they have been exposed, And, because of the
ongoing confidentiality of the mediation process, such alternatives cannot remove the
obstacle to Defendants' cross-examination of the experts.
The remaining cases cited by plaintiff are equally unpersuasive. For example, in Frank v. L L
Bean Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 233 (D. Me. 2005), the court declined to exclude the fruits of an
ex parte interview with a potential witness in which the opposing party's settlement position
was revealed. The court instead imposed financial sanctions. I n Frank, however, the party
violating settlement confidentiality revealed information to a former employee of the
opposing party, who shared the opposing party's interests. As a result, the opposing party
could not demonstrate prejudice arising from the breach of confidentiality, The court
expressly noted that, " [ h j a d Defendant been able to demonstrate such prejudice, such a
sanction might have been an [ * 1 4 ] appropriate remedy to counteract Plaintiffs ill-gotten
advantage." Frank. 311 F. Supp. 2d at 2 4 0 - 4 1 .
Here, Plaintiff disclosed Defendants' settlement positions to its owi i expert witnesses. That
information is inherently prejudicial to Defendants and is an "ill-gotten advantage," even if
the extent of the prejudice is not precisely measurable. In such circumstances, the
Magistrate Judge's order striking Plaintiffs expert witnesses, is both reasonable and
consistent with the analysis of Frank.
In In re AnonymouSr

283 F.3d 627 (4tt\ Cir, ZUUZJ, i k

;,

., . u^» . -

the confidentiality of the appellate mediation process. The t o u ; l . v j n d thai u
cni
counsel and local counsel had all violated the confidentiality requirements of the n, p Mte
mediation process during their subsequent bar-mediated fee dispute. The court, however,
weighing the totality of the circumstances, declined to issue sanctions for several reasons.

The court found tl iat i IOI ie of the participants had acted h i bad faitl i. 1 1 le court further foi ind
that the disclosures to another confidential forum did not severely impact the effectiveness of
the mediation [ * 1 5 ] process. Further, the court noted that, in light of the breaches by all
parties, no single party was harmed by the disclosures. 1d. at 635-36.
The in /c anonymous decision is fully consistent with the Magistrate Judge's determination in
the instant case. The case endorses the notion that " ^ ^ s a n c t i o n s determinations are to be
based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. Here, unlike in In re Anonymous, the only
party breaching confidentiality is the party with the opportunity to benefit from that breach,
Moreover, the breach did not occur within the confines of another confidential process, but
instead permitted an expert to offer an opinion influenced by confidential information upon
which he could not be fully cross-examined. As the Magistrate Judge found, such a breach
has the potential to seriously undermine the effectiveness of the mediated settler i nent
proceedings, thereby undermining important public policy.
A review us riainini'b remailting citations to unpublished decisions in which sanctions have
been denied reveals substantial differences in the totality of the circumstances from those
before this Court. See Frazierv. Layne Christensen Co., No. 04-C-315-C, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2358, 2005 WL 372253 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 1 1 , 2005): [ * 1 6 ] Concerned Citizens v.
Belle Haven Club, No. 3.-99CV1467, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26117 (D. Conn. Oct. 25, 2002).
Plaintiff has identified no comparable disclosure to that in issue here.
Moreover, thu I:K- ; H J : .:-.., otl lei distr ict coui t n lay have decided a sanctions question
erently than the Magistrate Judge does not in itself suggest that the Magistrate Judge's
abuse of discretion. See Heights Cmty. Congress, 774 F.2d at 140
...
. ..or the determination is the best or only conclusion that can be drawn
but whether it is a reasonable one.) The Court finds that the factual determinations of the
Magistrate Judge were not clearly erroneous and that the striking of Plaintiffs experts is not
contrary to law. Accordingly, tf ie Court will affirm the Magistrate Judge's order to strike,
-.iig agreed that the Magistrate Judge properly struck Plaintiffs expert witnesses as a
"!•/ for Plaintiffs breach of mediation confidentiality, the Court must determine whether
may retain other experts. The Court has reviewed the totality of the circumstances
and finds that [* 1 7 ] a complete denial of expert witnesses would be an excessive sanction,
not warranted by the nature of Plaintiffs conduct. The harm to Defendants is fully mitigated
by the exclusion of the testimony of those experts exposed to the confidential information.
The striking of experts is itself a harsh sanction and should not be made greater by the
exclusion of all expert evidence in support; of Plaintiffs case. Accordingly, notwithstanding the
late stage of these proceedings the r o u r t will permit Phintiff to engage new experts,
IP f.
Foi tl ie foregoing reasons, the Court affirms the order of the Magistrate Judge striking
Plaintiffs experts. The Court, however, will permit Plaintiff to designate new experts. In
accordance with the Magistrate Judge's order denying clarification (Docket # 323), deadlines
for expert reports will be addressed in the scheduling conference to be held after resoliition
of the dispositive motions.
Dated: Febm- *
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O P I N I O N : ORDER S T R I K I N G EXPERT WITNESSES
Pending before the coui t is a motion by defendant International Business Mad lii les
Corporation ("IBM") to strike plaintiffs experts due to Irwin Seating Company's ("Irwhi'"")
violation of mediation confidentiality (docket no, 1 95), Defendant J.D. Edwards World
Solutions Company has joined in IBM's motion,
Defendant IBM bases its motior i on the fact U v i
)roperly supplied its testifying
experts with confidential mediation statements and exhibits obtained during a mediation
between the parties, and that the experts reviewed these documents in rendering their
opinions
- d U u was sei it to volui itary facilitative
- ....
.. . . ^ b e r 2 1 , 2005 > »J i
entered by the court several days later w*\u
^ b for the mediation,
provided that "all information disclosed durirn. :» •- mediation session, including the conduct
-4 iemeanor of the parties and their counsel during the proceedings, must remain
w i i n J e n t i a l , and must not be disclosed [ * 3 ] to any other party nor to this court, without
consent of the party disclosing the information i " Order of November 2, 2005.
At the direction of the mediator, the parties each fun lished to I iei i nediation statements and
accompanying documents, highlighting those portions of the exhibits the defendants believed
to be the most important. IBM asserts, and Irwin does not deny, that Irwin subsequently
provided its experts with the defendants' confidential mediation statements accompanying
the documents, which explain the importance of certain documents and why they were
selected. The documents were also highlighted at the request of the mediator to indicate
those portions of the documents that the defendants believed to be the most important
C)i ni pi il 1 8 , 2 0 0 6 , lii in i |: i : - :!ii r :• = :ll 1: : *: :p • = i I: mi eports, one by Jeff Hagins assessing the
liabilit ; of the defei i :laii its ail i ::I till v 2 oil:! 1 BSI Ill: j I! Illai iiai me DeMario pertaining to damages. Each
t
• = [: • = 1 1: 1 = | : • : 1 il: = |: 1i :itl ; = tc t : s • till IE il: till =
the mediation material produced by
IBM and J.D. E< "
' See E : w 1: I I = |: •
' 0. 40 ("I have reviewed all of the
!
mediation e x h i b i t
J.L). Edwam-,
m o e ^ i i n g . " ) ; Expert Report of
r
Marianne [ * 4 ] L.
Exhibit B to ti
t ("Documents Reviewed by Mariaiine
DeMario
IBM mediation letter, 1/11/06. .
C to IBM mediation letter; Exhibit F to
JDE mediation brief. . . Exhibit G to IBM mediation letter, J.D. Edwards World Solutions
Company's Confidential Mediation Brief, 1/12/06. . . .Exhibit G to JDE mediation brief. . .
Exhibit A to JDE mediation brief). DeMario also cites to the mediation materials throughout
the text of her opinion. Id. at 3, 4 , 5, 6, 7, and 8. Irwin acknowledges that the mediation
briefs and attached exhibits "were provided to Mr. Hagins and Ms. DeMario as background
and were used by them as such." Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to IBM's Motion, filed May 22,
2006, at 3.
Confidentiality Rule
It is beyor id question that the n lediatioi 1 pi oceedings ii 1 ti lis case were intended to be
: : 1 f i ilentiai, and for settlei 1 lei it pi 11 poses only The explicit order of the court was sufficient
1 iotice of this fact to the parties witl toi it 1 1 101 e.
But there was rnoi e. The November 15, 2,005 letter froi n the mediator to the parties
reiterated that "[t]he mediation process is confidential." In reliance upon this, IBM states that
each page of its mediation [ * 5 ] statement was clearly marked in bold print:
"CONFIDENTIAL C O M M U N I C A T I O N FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY."

Moreover, I he looil court rules specifically provide for the < onfidentiahty ot ADR procedures
such as v o l u n t a s facihtative mediation. W.D Midi LOv H 16.2(e) provides:
Confidentiality
information disclosed during the ADR process shall not be
revealed to any one else without consent of the party who disclosed the
information. All ADR proceedings are considered to be compromised negolidlions
within the meaning of Federal Rules of Evidence 408. n l
1 he Sixth U n u i t has long recognized that
"*[t)here exists a strong public interest in favor of secrecy ot matters discussed by
parties during settlement negotiations. This is true whethet settlement
negotiations are done under the auspices of the court or inlormally between Hit
parties. The liability to negotiate and settle a case without trial fosters a more
efficient, more cost-effective, and significantly less burdened judicial system In
order for settlement talks to be effective, parties must feel uninhibited in th ir
communications." (emphasis added)

[ * 6 ] Goodyear Tire & Rubber v Chiles Power Supply, 332 F.3d 976, 980 (6th Cir. 2003). In
deciding to recognize the existence of a settlement privilege protecting settlement
communications, the court noted that

"confidential settlement communications are a ti adition in this country. See, e.g.,
Palmier/ v New York, 719 F.2d 8 6 1 , 865 (2nd Cir. 1985) (citing In Re: Franklin
Natl Bank, 92 FRD 468, 472 (E.P.N.Y. 1981)) (stating that "[sjecrecy of
settlement terms. . . is a well-established American litigation practice"). This
Court has always recognized the need for, and the constitutionality of, secrecy in
settlement p r o c e e d i n g ( n t a t i n n c omitted)." Id. at 980.

In summary, the court held that "any communications made in furtherance of settlement are
privileged." Id. 983.

Iootnotes
n l Rule 408 provides in pertinent pari
t vidence of conduct or statements made in
compromised negotiations is likewise not ulimssible. This rule does not require the exclusion
of any evidence otherwise disrovehilili n n i»h because it r presented in the e n u r e nf
compromised negotiations...

L nc j F-ootnotes-

I ' III
Violation of the Conflict Rule

Fhere is also no question but 11 uL li win's lawyers provided copies of IBM's and Jul •:
mediation briefs and exhibits to the experts. See Affidavit of Jeff 1, Hagins dated May 19,
2006 at P 3; Affidavit of Marianne L. DeMario dated May 19, 2006 at P 3. While both experts
deny either of the mediation briefs from the defendants influenced them in developing their
opinion, they both admit they read these mediation statements as they began their analysis.
Mr Hagins stated, "I did read both IBM's and JDE's mediation briefs once, as part of my
iilitial reading of foundational materials,. . . in order to gain some sense of what the case was
about. I read these mediation briefs on mv computer in the electronic format in wt lich they
were provided to me." i 1a.r-<- n" f "•*
Ms. DeMario states. "I read the mediation brief for context, when I first started working on
my damages analysis. . .." Ms. DeMario explains that she "cited certain documents as
exhibits to the mediation briefs for the sake of simplicity, since it was easier to cite them that
way than to locate the same documents among the thousands of pages of materials that had
been provided f * 8 " *
••. •
•* m's lawyers" DeMario's affidavit at 6. n2
, uotnotes

n2 This protestation proves too i i iuc:l i, since by utilizing ti le exhibits attached to defendants*
briefs throughout her analysis, rather than the bates-stamped versions, she was, necessarily,
repeatedly pi filed back to defendants' briefs and their marked up "opies of the documents.

__F

j | • :)otnotes

Both experts claim they do not recall what the defendants' mediation positions were, but in
this context the affidavits are not particularly persuasive since it is readily apparent both
were drawn up by the same hand. For example, Mr, Hagins testifies in paragraph 7 of his
affidavit
I il

nnl c i ii in I ill! ui'b ill IBM' . iniill IMI . incdhilmmil positions were",

I liil'iE I Is C sf l a I i' : • s t a t e s in n p a i agii apl i ^ :: f I lei all 1 Ida it:
"I don't even recall what were IBM's ai id JDE's n mediation positions,"

Plaintiff does not deny the documents were confidential documents nor that its lawyers
provided them to the plaintiffs experts, nor that the plaintiff's experts reviewed these
documents [ * 9 ] in preparing their reports. Rather, plaintiffs defense is an attempt to
minimize the impact these disclosures had and to argue that the sanction requested by
defendants ~ that these experts be stricken as expert witnesses — is too severe.
-nds that plaintiff's conduct was in direct derogation of the order of this court, tl r 2
J
mmon understanding of the purpose for which the
J. Clearly the mediation briefs and the marked-up
-nents attache? to them constituted settlement communicatioi is. While defendants •
4
V acknowledge that the documents themselves were otherwise producible to the
s experts, they persuasively argue that the mediation reports themselves, and the
0
' 3 of portions of documents especially selected by the defendants as referred to in

their mediation reports, were communications subject to the settlement privilege, not grist
for the experts' mill.
I m p a c t of Violation of Confidentiality
The court need not find a bad intent on the part of Irwin's lawyers in furnishing all of these
materials to their experts. What the court does find, whatever the intent, [ * 1 0 ] was that
these documents were furnished on purpose for the experts to review, and they were in fact
reviewed. This is the reality of the situation confronting the court, and it is a dilemma created
solely by the actions of plaintiff's own lawyers.
Nor does the problem end here since these reports are now a part of the record used by the
plaintiff's experts, and the experts are subject to cross-examination on t h e m . Any crossexamination, of course, runs a risk of touching on the privileged communications. Moreover,
and perhaps more significantly, there is no adequate way to assess the impact the mediation
briefs had on the experts, and how the experts may have shaped their evaluations
consciously or unconsciously in response to the claims made and positions taken by
defendants in their mediation briefs. Even in denying any recall of what defendants' positions
were in their reports, both experts concede these briefs were among the first documents they
read, "in order to gain some sense of what the case was about." n3 The bell has been rung.
There are simply some things that cannot be forgotten once they are learned.
Footnotes

n3 By way of analogy, apropos to this time of the year, if a football coach learns that his
opponent for next week's game is relying on his team's ability to pass to a particular deep
receiver, the coach learning this will doubtlessly concentrate his attention on strategies to
cover that receiver.

End Footnotes

[*11]

Moreover, plaintiff's counsel's behavior in sharing these materials with unauthorized persons
strikes at the heart of the ADR process.
Striking an expert witness is a harsh remedy, but not an unfair one, where a party has
placed its experts at risk by infusing them with knowledge to which they were not entitled.
The risk should not be upon the innocent defendants in this instance. The extent of the
damage done in terms of how much these mediation briefs and the highlighted documents
affected the experts, again consciously or unconsciously, in shaping their approaches and
their opinions, is not truly knowable nor easily remediable. Where this situation arises from a
clear violation of the court's order and the settlement privilege generally, it is the plaintiff
that must bear the brunt of the resolution.
Defendant's motion is GRANTED, and plaintiffs experts Hagins and DeMario are stricken as
experts and shall not testify in this action. n4 Movant IBM is also awarded costs and
attorney's fees in the amount of $ 1,000.00, payable within 30 days. See, Rules 26(c) and 37
(a)(4). If either party objects within 10 days of this order to the amount assessed, IBM shall,
within 7 days thereafter, [ * 1 2 ] provide an affidavit together with any supporting
documentation justifying the amount it believes is appropriate (more or less than $
1,000.00), and plaintiff shall have 7 days thereafter to file an appropriate response. The
court may schedule a further hearing on the question of costs if it deems it necessary.
Footnotes

n4 The court is aware this resolution may also have a salutary effect in preserving
confidences of future mediation participants, and the candor necessary to successful
facilitative mediations. A contrary result would certainly have a dramatically contrary impact.

End Footnotes
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 29, 2006
/s/ Hugh W. Brenneman, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge
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